This paper examines the association between bank debt maturity and relationship lending using a unique survey sample of 3,366 SMEs from 19 European countries. The knowledge of how the institutional environment shapes relationship lending helps us to understand how current institutional changes, such as Basel II, might affect the SME-bank relationship and hence, SME access to financing. Our results indicate that stronger firmbank relationships lengthen the maturity of bank loans and that this association is country specific. For example, we show that relationship lending increases (decreases) the likelihood of long-term debt for SMEs in countries with less (more) competition in the banking sector. The implication of our results is that new unified rules within the European community may impact SME access to bank debt differently, depending on the country the firm operates in. This is important for SMEs, banks and policy makers.
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Introduction
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are, in contrast to large firms, informationally more opaque, have on average higher growth rates, are financially more constrained, and are more dependent on bank loans when outside financing is needed. For a bank, the limited information available about the SME increases the risk associated with providing financing, which induces the bank to reduce loan maturity and increase the interest rate. To optimize loan conditions SMEs have an incentive to build a relationship with their bank(s) in order to minimize the information asymmetry.
Empirical work examining the effect of relationship lending on bank financing for SMEs shows large variation in the results across different countries.
i This evidence could suggest that instead of firm specific characteristics, country specific determinants are driving the effect of relationship lending on the capital structure of small firms. However, the observed disparity in the empirical results may also arise from differences in sample selection, variable definitions, and/or estimation methods between the various studies. A comprehensive analysis using a broad cross-country sample could shed more light on this issue.
Our paper analyzes the effect of relationship lending on bank loan maturity using a unique sample of 3,366 SMEs from 19 European countries. This sample allows us to control for cross-country heterogeneity. Our study yields two specific contributions to the bank We first analyze our sample without controlling for country specific determinants. Our results indicate that stronger firm-bank relationships lengthen the maturity of bank loans.
More specifically, the fewer bank relationships a firm maintains the longer the maturity of bank loans received. However, once we control for country-specific heterogeneity in our sample the relationship lending indicators become statistically insignificant. This important finding confirms our conjecture that country-specific determinants influence the effects of relationship lending on SME bank debt.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 discusses the data and method. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
Theory and hypotheses development
Financial intermediation theory demonstrates that asymmetric information plays an important role in debt contract negotiations between the bank and the firm. This is even more pronounced for small firms because they usually are not able to provide reliable hard information to their bank (Berger et al., 2001) . Banks react to this market imperfection by reducing the maturity of their outstanding loans. Shorter loans allow them to more frequently monitor the firm's performance and, if necessary, vary the terms of the contracts before losses have accumulated (Diamond, 1991; Rajan, 1992) . To increase the readiness of the bank to improve the conditions of a debt contract, for example, a longer loan maturity or availability of more credit, the firm can enhance the flow of information to the bank by holding a closer firm-bank relationship (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995; Harhoff and Körting, 1998) .
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Previous studies examining the effect of relationship lending on the cost of bank financing for SMEs show large variation in reported results across European countries. For example, Harhoff and Körting (1998) , Machauer and Weber (1998) , Elsas and Krahnen (1998) and Lehmann and Neuberger (2001) do not find a significant correlation between relationship lending and the cost of bank debt for German firms. For Italy Angelini et al. (1998) , and for Belgium Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) report that longer bank relationships significantly increases the cost of borrowing. Hernández and Martínez (2006) find that Spanish SMEs that work with fewer banks obtain debt at a lower cost. When analyzing the effect of relationship lending on credit availability the results are less ambiguous, although there is some variation. Harhoff and Körting (1998) and Lehmann and Neuberger (2001) find that relationship lending reduces credit rationing in Germany. Angelini et al. (1998) report that longer and more concentrated bank relationships increase the availability of bank debt for Italian firms, similar to the evidence for Belgium. However, in
Belgium these results seem to be dependent on the relative size of firms and banks (De Bodt et al., 2005) .
The above empirical evidence indicates that the effect of relationship lending on bank financing for small European firms might also be driven by the country where the contracting takes place. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) predict that small firms are more restricted in obtaining external finance than large firms and therefore, institutional factors might be more important in the determination of leverage. Jõeveer (2005) confirms this prediction by showing that country specific factors contribute more to capital structure determination for small firms than for large firms. Hall et al. (2004) conclude that there is variation in both SME capital structure and the determinants of capital structure among eight European countries. Moreover, Detragiache et al. (2000) show that the likelihood of establishing multiple bank relationships depends on institutional factors such as loan enforcement 4 mechanisms and bank fragility. Although, these studies support our conjecture that country specific characteristics are important in explaining the effect of relationship lending on SME bank financing, we still lack a comprehensive study in this area.
Our paper constitutes a first step to filling this gap in the literature, by analyzing the effect of relationship lending on bank loan maturity while controlling for cross-country heterogeneity. So far, the evidence of the influence of relationship lending on loan maturity is sparse and limited to the U.S. market.
ii Our data not only permit us to control for country specific characteristics when analyzing the effect of relationship lending on bank loan maturity, but also allows us to examine whether there is variation in that effect between the 19
European countries represented in our sample. This is important if we want to better understand the implication of current institutional changes and its effect on SME access to financing. For example, Basel II will limit the use of soft information which is fundamental in relationship lending. This might reduce the likelihood of SMEs obtaining long-term debt in countries where relationship lending helps to lengthen the maturity of bank loans. Our study does not aim to answer which specific country determinants influence relationship lending and its effect on bank loan maturity, or whether these effects differ between large and small firms. This we leave for further research. As for the nine activity sectors considered in the survey, the lowest representation corresponds to the Repair and Hotels/Catering industries with 82 and 176 observations respectively, whereas the largest industry sector is manufacturing with 607 firms.
Data and Method
iv
The dependent variable
To create the dependent variable we utilize the ENSR Survey in which managers are asked for the term of the largest loan the firm received from any bank during the last 3 years.
The answers are categorized as follows: (1) less than 1 month, (2) 1 to 6 months, (3) 6 months to 1 year, (4) 1 to 3 years, (5) 3 to 5 years, and (6) 5 
The independent variables
In this section we describe the explanatory variables utilized in our posterior analysis. Table 3 provides detailed definitions of all the variables.
Firm-bank relationship variables
The literature on relationship lending provides us with several definitions to measure the strength of a firm-bank relationship. One thing these definitions have in common is that they focus on the basic dimension of private information. can also obtain soft information, i.e. qualitative information. This is gathered by interaction between the loan officer and the firm's manager and refers to manager capacity, integrity, and the quality of the firm's project. This kind of information appears to be very important in small firm relationship lending, since small businesses usually lack reliable hard information.
Given the important role of soft information in relationship lending, we create a dummy variable to proxy for soft information. Respondents of the ENSR survey are asked what type of information they regularly present to their bank(s). When the bank obtains qualitative (soft) information from the respondent our dummy is given a value of one and zero otherwise. Consistent with the relationship lending literature, we expect the coefficient on this variable to have a positive sign indicating that firms that provide soft information to their banks have loans with longer maturity.
Our second proxy for relationship lending is the number of bank relationships. The existence of several intermediaries lending money to the firm reduces the privacy and value of the information, because each bank will obtain similar data when they screen and/or monitor the firm (Cole, 1998; Carletti, 2004) . Moreover, if banks are equally informed about the quality of the firm, managers may have more flexibility to change lenders, reducing the expected duration of the relationship and the incentive for the bank to invest in the acquisition of private information (Chan et al., 1986; Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993) . Also, Von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (2004) show the existence of a negative association between the number of bank relationships and the flow of private information to the bank. Firms that disclose a substantial amount of private information are more likely to work with a small 7 number of creditors in order to restrict the dissemination of confidential information, whereas firms disclosing little private information are less concerned about dealing with many lenders.
We obtain from the ENSR survey the number of banks the firm has credit lines with:
(1) only one bank, (2) two or three banks and (3) four banks or more. This allows us to define three dummy variables: exclusivity, two-three relationships and more than three relationships, which is coded one when the firm maintains one, two or three, or more than three banks relationships respectively, and zero otherwise. In order to avoid the dummy trap, we include only the first two dummy variables in our model. We expect them to appear in our regressions with a positive coefficient, indicating that firms with more concentrated -closer and stronger -bank relationships are more likely to obtain long-term debt. Tables 4 and 5 give an overview of the bank relationship variables by country and firm size ranked in ascending order. Ongena and Smith (2000) for large firms, panel B shows that larger firms maintain on average more bank relationships than smaller firms. Less than 10% of micro and small firms are involved with more than three banks, while for medium size firms this is more than 23%.
In Table 5 we observe that the majority of firms (82%) provide their bank(s) with some form of balance sheet and/or income statement. Other forms of information disclosure are less common. Surprisingly, 371 out of 3,290 firms (11%) do not provide information at all to their bank(s). Of these 371 firms, 79% are very small firms (fewer than 10 employees). We 8 also observe considerable cross-country variation. The release of soft information ranges from 57.93% in Norway to 1.09% and 8.22% in France and Italy, respectively.
Consistent with the predictions of Von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (2004) , it seems that firms in some countries shape their relationship with banks using two dimensions: the number of creditors and the amount of confidential information given to the creditors. For example, it is interesting to note that Italian firms deal with many creditors, but disclose little private information; whereas firms in Norway disclose a substantial amount of private information, but they reduce the severity of information leakage by restricting themselves to a small number of creditors.
Firm control and country level variables
To account for sample heterogeneity we include several firm specific control variables in our models. vii Firm size is one of the known determinants of debt maturity. To proxy for firm size we use the number of employees working in the firm. This variable is coded from 1 to 3, where 1 represents firms with 0-9 employees, 2 are firms with 10-49 employees and 3
are firms with 50-249 employees, or what we respectively call micro, small and medium sized firms. The age variable reflects the number of years that the firm has been in operation. It ranges from 1 to 4, with 1 being less than two years in operation, 2 representing two to five years, 3 being six to ten years, and 4 more than ten years in operation. The debt variable is a qualitative variable that represents the firm's total amount of bank debt. This variable ranges from 1 to 6 (higher values indicate higher levels of debt) and is used as a proxy for firm leverage. To proxy for the firm's financial access we include a variable (availability) which equals one when the firm received all the loans requested from its bank(s) in the last 3 years and zero otherwise. Finally, we also include nine sector dummies to control for differences 9 across industries. Rajan and Zingales (1995) point out that based on their need for external finance, different industries may have varying requirements for bank financing. In addition to the existence of asymmetric information between the firm and the bank, the loan maturity decision also depends on the financial and legal environment as well as the economic situation in which the contracting takes place. Since European countries have significant variation in their financial, legal and economic environment (La Porta et al. 1997 , 1998 , the effect of relationship lending on loan maturity could differ significantly across countries. To control for this cross-country heterogeneity, we include 19 country dummies.
Method
To assess the impact of bank-firm relationships on bank loan maturity, while controlling for firm-specific characteristics and country heterogeneity, we estimate the following logistic regression: Country is a vector of country dummies; and i ε is the residual. Table 7 , model 1 presents the analysis of the effect of the firm-bank relationship indicators on bank loan maturity while controlling for firm specific characteristics. We use the variable indicating more than three relationships as our reference category. Our result shows that the coefficients on the exclusivity variable and two-three relationships variable are positive and statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively, with the former greater in magnitude. This evidence indicates that close firm-bank relationships increase the likelihood of obtaining longer term bank loans. This is consistent with the theory that bank relationships reduce the asymmetric information problem between the firm and the bank. The control variables for size, age, debt and availability are also significant. The positive sign on the age, debt and availability variables indicates that older, financially healthier firms, with higher leverage have longer bank loan maturity. Older firms are usually exposed to less asymmetric information, while highly levered firms increase their debt maturity to avoid the liquidity risk associated with short-term debt (Diamond, 1991) . The negative coefficient on the size variable indicates that larger firms are more likely to use short-term debt.
Results
viii
In model 2 we include the industry dummies to control for possible differences in requirements of bank financing across sectors, which might be driving our firm specific results. Wholesale Trade is the only sector with a marginally significant coefficient (α = 0.05)
indicating that sector specific characteristics do not appear to influence the effect of relationship lending on bank loan maturity.
In model 3 we control for the country's level of inflation and GDP growth. It is well known that bank lending is demand driven and that the interest rate level is positively related to the level of risk associated with the loan. Therefore, these factors are likely to influence debt maturity. Our results confirm this prediction. Both variables are significant (for GDP 11 growth α=0.01 and for inflation α=0.05) and have the predicted sign. In a high growth, low interest rate environment, firms are more likely to obtain bank loans with longer maturity.
Also interesting to observe is the reduction in the magnitude and statistical significance of our relationship variables, indicating that its effect on bank loan maturity is influenced by country specific factors.
In Table 8 we further investigate this by adding country dummies to our firm specific variables. We do not include a dummy for the Netherlands, which we use as our base
category. ix Model 1 shows significant cross-country differences in bank loan maturity for SMEs. Small firms in France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and the UK are less likely to obtain long-term debt compared to firms in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and the Netherlands. This is consistent with previous studies for large publicly traded companies (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Fan et al., 2003) . A particularly interesting finding is that the firmbank relationship variables, exclusivity and two-three-relationships, become statistically insignificant. This suggests that relationship lending is not orthogonal to cross-country heterogeneity, confirming our expectations that country-specific characteristics are important in determining the effect relationship lending has on SMEs financing.
Theory, as well as empirical evidence, suggests that the degree of concentration of the banking sector, i.e. the level of competition among banks, might be the most important country specific characteristic affecting the SME-bank relationship. Petersen and Rajan (1995) predict that banks are more likely to invest in relationship lending in concentrated credit markets, because the reduced degree of inter-bank competition allows them to extract rents. On the contrary, Boot and Thakor (2000) show that bank competition could make relationship lending more attractive for banks because it provides a better shelter against price competition. To test the robustness of our result that country specific determinants affect relationship lending, we next examine whether the degree of bank competition alters the 12 effect of relationship lending on bank loan maturity for SMEs. We bifurcate our sample into high and low competitive banking systems. We do so by dividing the countries in our sample around the median (0.54) of the degree of concentration of the banking system, measured as the fraction of banks assets held by the three largest commercial banks in each country. We define low (high) competitive banking systems as those where the banking concentration is above (below) the median and run our basic model for each group. The results, reported in model 2 of Table 8 , show that firms borrowing from two or three banks in low competitive markets are more likely to obtain longer term bank debt than firms borrowing from more than three banks. In model 3, firms maintaining an exclusive bank relationship in high competitive markets are more likely to use short-term debt. Although, the results are marginally significant and do not hold for all relationships defined in our regression, the evidence is consistent with Petersen and Rajan´s (1995) argument that SMEs in low competitive banking markets benefit more from a close firm-bank relationship.
To conclude, all our models in Tables 7 and 8 show a significant size effect, such that larger firms are more likely to use short-term debt. To further examine the role of country specific determinants on bank loan maturity and whether this depends on firm size, we split our sample into micro, small and medium sized firms and re-run our models. In unreported results we find that, in addition to cross-country heterogeneity, the size effect may play an important role.
x Unfortunately, our data set does not allow us to test it properly. Ideally, we should replace the country dummies with the appropriate country specific variables and then examine the effects for different size classes. This we leave for future research.
Conclusion
Previous studies examining relationship lending and its effect on bank financing for SMEs show differing results. We argue that this is due primarily to the influence of country 13 specific factors. We test this conjecture by analyzing the effect of relationship lending on bank loan maturity using a unique sample of 3,366 SMEs from 19 European countries. Our paper is the first to address this issue for such a comprehensive sample of European SMEs.
Consistent with the theory of financial intermediation we find that, after controlling for firm specific characteristics such as size, age, debt and financial situation, close firm-bank relationships increase the likelihood of obtaining longer term bank loans. However, once we allow cross-country heterogeneity to influence our results we show that bank relationship lending and its effect on bank loan maturity for European SMEs is impacted by country specific factors. More specifically, small firms in France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and the UK are less likely to obtain long-term debt compared to firms in Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway and the Netherlands. In addition, we find that firms in a high growth and low interest rate environment are more likely to obtain bank loans with longer maturity and that those in countries with more concentration in the banking sector benefit more from close firm-bank relationships.
Our results are important for SMEs, bank managers and policy makers such that they indicate that creation of unified rules within the European community may impact SME access to bank debt differently, depending on the country the firm operates in. Although, our results should be read with some caution because of sample sizes in comparative studies such as this, our findings are not trivial considering the central role of bank debt in SME capital structure, and the importance of the SMEs in the development of GDP and job creation of Europe.
Our paper provides some preliminary insights into the association between the institutional environment and small firm financing, and uncovers a very interesting area for future research. Further studies could extend our results by attempting to explain which 14 specific country institutional factors are important in determining SME capital structure and its effect on relationship lending.
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End notes
i Among others, see Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) for the U.S.; Angelini et al. (1998) for Italy; Harhoff and Körting (1998) Hester (1979) finds that firms who previously borrowed from a bank receive shorter loan maturities, but if a relevant bank officer felt that this borrower had been a highly profitable customer to the bank in the past, the loan is for a longer maturity than loans to other individuals. Ortiz-Molina and Pena (2004) show that longer, more concentrated and broader firm-bank relationships are not associated with longer debt maturities for small businesses.
iii The 2002 ENSR Survey on SMEs uses a Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system to collect data from entrepreneurs and managers within SMEs, all being independent private enterprises with less than 250 employees in all sectors of industry in Europe. The survey was conducted from April-August 2001. To arrive at sufficiently reliable conclusions at the level of size classes within individual countries more than 100 interviews for each size class-country combination were carried out, finally resulting in 7699 completed interviews. The overall design and implementation of the stratification, the questionnaire and the fieldwork were done in close collaboration between staff from EIM Business & Policy Research in the Netherlands, partners in the ENSR network and Intromart. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/enterprise_policy/analysis/observatory_en.htm for further information. iv Due to limited firm specific observation for Lichtenstein and Denmark (less than 100), we also run our regression without these countries. The results remain qualitatively the same. v Although, we realize that we discard information by dichotomizing our interval variable, we choose this approach for several reasons. First, it creates a more balanced sample. For example we have only 46 firms for which the largest term loan has a maturity of less than 6 months as opposed to 869 firms with loan maturity longer than 5 years. Second, the binary logistic regression is more intuitive to interpret than the multinomial logistic regression. We have re-run all our model specifications using ordered logistic regressions and the results remain qualitatively the same. The percentage of correctly predicted values is between 64% and 76% across all debt maturity specifications and all models (using both, binary and multinomial logistic regressions). vi We use the number of employees as proxy for firm size, which we use to divide the sample in three groups: micro firms with 0-9 employees, small firms with 10-49 employees, and medium firms with 50-249 employees. vii The use of firm specific variables is limited by the information available in the ENSR survey.
viii Scherr and Hulburt (2001) Table 2 gives an overview of firm bank loan maturity by country and firm size ranked in ascending order. Data is obtained from the 2002 ENSR survey on small and medium-sized enterprises, observatory of European SMEs, provided by the EIM Business and Policy Research in the Netherlands, in which managers are asked the term for the largest loan the firm received from any bank during the last three years. Firm size is measured by the number of employees. The averages are calculated by categorizing the debt maturity variable such that less than one month equals 1, 1 to 6 months equals 2, 6 months to 1 year equals 3, 1 to 3 years equals 4, 3 to 5 years equals 5, and 5 years or longer equals 6. Growth in GDP expressed in 1990 U.S. dollars, averaged over the 1990-2000 period. The average growth rate for a period of n years is derived as the geometric mean of the annual growth rates for that period. An indicator of the firm size, which takes on the values: 1 when the firm has less than 9 employees, 2 when the number of employees is between 10 and 49, and 3 when the firm has more than 49 employees. Age 1 A measure of the number of years that the firm has been in operation, which takes on the values: 1 when it has been less than 2 years, 2 when it has been between 2 and 5 years, 3 when it has been between 6 and 10 years, and 4 when it has been more than 10 years. Debt 1 A measure of the amount of liabilities to all of the firm's banks, which takes on the values: 1 when the liabilities amount to less than 89485 U.S. dollars, 2 when they do between 89486 and 447422, 3 when they do between 447423 and 894846, 4 when they do between 894847 and 2684539, 5 when they do between 2684540 and 4474232, and 6 when the liabilities are above 4474233 U.S. dollars. Availability 1 An indicator of the financial situation of the firm, which equals one when the firm got all the loans it needed from its bank in the last 3 years and zero otherwise. 0.097 0.085 Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level is indicated by *, **, ***, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
